After complications from the initial surgery developed, the left implant was replaced in December 1980 by a model also manufactured by 3M/Mc Ghan. at 3.)In 1986 Allison was diagnosed with Hashimoto's thyroiditis (diffuse infiltration of the thyroid gland with white blood cells, resulting in diffuse goiter). Bode that he did not believe that Allison's breast implants were a source of her medical problems. at 10-11.) Although Allison does not contend that her diabetes, thyroiditis, or neuropathies were caused or exacerbated by the implants, the parties dispute the degree of debilitation caused by Allison's diabetes, which 3M/Mc Ghan alleges was severe. After removal of the implants, Allison's non-diabetic symptoms improved. Schatten again evaluated Allison in 1993, shortly after the implants were removed. To establish causation in the negligence claim, Allison proposed testimony from three physicians, Drs. The district court, in accordance with the Supreme Court's mandate for federal judges to exercise gatekeeping functions to determine the reliability and relevance of scientific evidence, held a Daubert hearing.
Smith Corp., 590 F.2d 415, 418 (1978) (pointing out that Rule 702, although broadening “the range of admissible expert testimony,” does not alter the “manifestly erroneous” standard of review). 3M/Mc Ghan therefore challenged Allison's expert testimony on the basis of Rules 401, 402, 403, 702 and 703.a. These stricter standards are necessary because of the potential impact on the jury of expert testimony. 2786, to ensure that scientific evidence is both reliable and relevant before being admitted as evidence. The Court opined that scientific knowledge is far afield from the normal expertise of judges and that they should proceed with caution lest they exceed their grasp. Using independent court-appointed experts may serve to quell the pseudo-scientist criticism. 19 (9th Cir.1995) (noting on remand findings of other circuits denying admissibility of expert testimony on the issue of Bendectin causation of limb reduction). The judge's role is to keep unreliable and irrelevant information from the jury because of its inability to assist in factual determinations, its potential to create confusion, and its lack of probative value.(1) The Reliability Prong The Daubert Court listed four noninclusive factors courts should consider in determining reliability under Rule 702:(1) whether the theory or technique can be tested; (2) whether it has been subjected to peer review; (3) whether the technique has a high known or potential rate of error; and (4) whether the theory has attained general acceptance within the scientific community.
Summarizing the applicable rules of admissibility of scientific evidence, this Court in City of Tuscaloosa, 158 F.3d at 562, stated that scientific expert testimony is admissible when(1) the expert is qualified to testify competently regarding the matters he intends to address; (2) the methodology by which the expert reaches his conclusion is sufficiently reliable as determined by the sort of inquiry mandated in Daubert; and (3) the testimony assists the trier of fact, through the application of scientific, technical, or specialized expertise, to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. Any proffer of scientific evidence is also subject to other rules of evidence. Thus, while Rules 401 and 402 reflect the general policy of the Federal Rules for liberal admission of evidence, Rule 403, working in conjunction with Rules 702 and 703, militates against this general policy by giving courts discretion to preclude expert testimony unless it passes more stringent standards of reliability and relevance. 512 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting also that judges are not trained scientists). Also, a judge may enlist outside experts to assist in this sometimes very difficult decision. While some courts on occasion use evidentiary findings of other courts as precedent when reviewing essentially the same factual issues in their Daubert decisions, the district court here did not use other breast implant causation precedents in making its decision. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1322 n.
Under Rule 104(a) the parties submitted hundreds of scientific studies and journal articles for the district court to examine. Daubert 's flexible four-pronged analysis supplanted the longstanding “austere” Frye standard which allowed the admission of expert testimony when it was generally accepted in the relevant scientific community.
In making its determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges.
Strict Liability/Failure to Warn The district court properly granted summary judgment on the strict liability claims. Allison argues that her claim in strict liability/failure to warn should be allowed to stand because Georgia's Supreme Court found that “failure to warn causes of action [are] outside the ambit of the statue of repose․” Chrysler Corp. Furthermore, Allison ignores the clear, unambiguous language of the statute which exempts only negligence actions. 3M/Mc Ghan clearly raised indefiniteness as an issue in its affirmative defense in its Master Answer adopted by the court. Finally, Bank allows the plaintiff to make a more definite statement “[w]here a more carefully drafted complaint might state a claim․” 928 F.2d at 1112.
The district court found that the above language provides an exception to the statute of repose for negligence actions claiming failure to warn and disease causation, but does not create an exception for these theories under strict liability claims. Allison has failed to cite any Georgia cases in which a claim for strict liability/failure to warn was excepted from the statute of repose. Where the misrepresentation is wilfully made, privity is not necessary to give rise to the cause of action. Despite the instructions of the transferee court, litigants cannot cast on the district court the burden of prodding them into filing appropriate pleadings. 17.) Thus, Allison's claim that 3M/Mc Ghan never sought a more definite statement is contrary to the record. Because the court properly excluded the expert testimony, we affirm its grant of summary judgment on the negligence claims. After careful but deferential review, we conclude that the district court's Daubert rulings were correct. “Cases arise where it is very much a matter of discretion with the court whether to receive or exclude the evidence; but the appellate court will not reverse in such a case, unless the ruling is manifestly erroneous.” Id. Wright, King & Spalding, Jane Fugate Thorpe, Alston & Bird, Atlanta, GA, David P. She asserted claims in negligence, fraud/misrepresentation and strict liability/failure to warn. She discussed her decision with her parents and a cousin who had implants. The pathology report stated that the outer shell of one implant was collapsed and the other contained minimal saline. Catherine “Kip” Allison sought recovery in district court for injuries allegedly suffered from breast implants manufactured by Mc Ghan Medical Corporation and Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Company (“3M/Mc Ghan”). We additionally affirm summary judgment on Allison's other claims. Background In December 1979, at age 21, Kip Allison decided to get cosmetic silicone breast implants. Philip Beegle, a plastic surgeon, performed the explantation surgery in February 1993. The court additionally barred the claims for fraud/misrepresentation and failure to warn. Standards of Review We review the district court's grants of partial summary judgment and summary judgment de novo, reviewing all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and applying the same standard as the district court. Singletary, 142 F.3d 1252, 1253 (11th Cir.1998); Hale v. Dougherty County, Ga., 684 F.2d 1365, 1369 (11th Cir.1982).